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Abstract 
The objective of this dissertation was to investigate the asymmetric pass-through of 
oil prices to natural gas and gasoline prices under the non-linear autoregressive 
distributed lags (NARDL) modelling approach proposed by Shin et al. (2013). Both 
short- and long-run non-linearities were tested for by deriving the positive and 
negative partial sum decompositions of the dependent variables.  In addition, it was 
feasible through the econometric analysis to quantify the respective responses to 
positive and negative oil price shocks from the asymmetric dynamic multipliers. The 
obtained results indicated an asymmetric relationship in most of the cases, yet with a 
different price transmission mechanism each time. These findings can have significant 
policy implications as well.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between the international prices of crude oil and natural gas or 
gasoline prices has been a subject of investigation for the last three decades causing a 
controversy among researchers. Oil and natural gas are substitutes in consumption and 
are both complements and rivals regarding the electricity production. This is the 
reason of an expected historical co-movement between the prices of these two 
commodities. As far as the gasoline is concerned, it is a fuel derived from crude oil 
whose cost is the main determinant of gasoline’s price. According to US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), until 2014 gasoline was the main transportation 
fuel used in the US since every citizen used more than a gallon per day.1 Thus, 
understanding the transmission mechanism of positive and negative crude oil shocks 
to wholesale and retail fuel prices is of paramount importance for a country’s energy 
policy making, optimal energy risk hedging and portfolio risk management, in 
general. The movement of these energy commodities’ prices can affect not only the 
consumption and production expenditure but also future investment decisions. 
 However, the majority of these economic and financial variables behave in a 
non-linear manner causing a corresponding non-linear interaction with each other 
which cannot be a simple and historically stable relationship. Moreover, there is a 
widely held belief that there is an inconsistency in the pass-through procedure from 
upstream to downstream prices. More specifically, many observers claim that gasoline 
prices react asymmetrically to oil price changes, that is to say oil firms and individual 
retailers respond faster to crude oil price increases than decreases. For instance, when 
refiners or retailers experience a decline in their input costs, they do not rush to 
decrease, accordingly, the wholesale or retail prices since they can take advantage of 
the additional profits. This situation cannot last indefinitely and is kept on as long as 
the demand has not been altered. Some competitors will realize that by reducing the 
prices they can enjoy greater profits from the larger quantities of product they will 
sell. Eventually, all will be forced to adjust the price to the new equilibrium. On the 
other hand, economic agents tend to increase the prices as soon as they can in order to 
maintain their regular profit margins and not to experience any losses. This 
                                                          
1 For more details see at: http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=gasoline_use 
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asymmetric price adjustment is known as “rockets and feathers” effect because prices 
tend to rise like a rocket but fall like a feather, and was first introduced by Bacon 
(1991). Although the economic theory suggests no prevalent inclination for output 
prices to respond differently to input cost increases and decreases, a several number of 
articles were published the following years whose results were in accordance with that 
of Bacon (1991). 
 Asymmetric behavior can be attributed to a blend of several reasons. To begin 
with, the market power of several locally active gas stations can affect both the 
adjustment speed of the prices and the consumer search behavior. For instance, 
retailers are not eager to pass through the small changes of input costs to the final 
product’s value since consumers are not willing to bear the extra cost of searching for 
a barely less expensive price. Thus, retailers can afford to wait when crude prices are 
decreasing slowly and exploit the higher profit margins. However, consumers 
intensify their searching activity when they realize the existence of large shocks. 
Consequently, gas station owners behave more competitively and respond faster to the 
market requirements to avoid the risk of losing customers. Furthermore, consumers’ 
response may be quicker when prices grow because they expect this upward trend to 
carry on in the future. This situation gives rise to higher demand which in turn 
accelerates the growth of retail gasoline prices. Contrariwise, a downward trend of 
crude prices will result in the opposite reaction of the consumers. The demand of the 
latter will be in lower levels than before because they anticipate an even better price 
the next few days.  
 Another possible reason of the asymmetric pricing is the negative relationship 
between inventory levels and fuel prices. When oil prices increase (decrease) and, 
subsequently, crude oil supply declines (rises), the level of gasoline inventories is 
reduced (increased) which leads to a higher (lower) value of retail gasoline prices. 
Finally, imperfect competition of the market, collusive behavior among firms, size of 
the market and accounting practices could all cause retail prices to respond in a 
dissimilar pattern to input cost changes.  
 The objective of this work is to investigate the asymmetric pass-through of oil 
prices not only to gasoline but also to natural gas prices and what significant policy 
implications can be found. The countries under investigation will be Greece, Italy, 
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Spain, United Kingdom (UK) and US. The methodology that will be applied is the 
non-linear autoregressive distributed lags (NARDL) model proposed by Shin et al. 
(2013). Both short- and long-run non-linearities will be tested for by deriving the 
positive and negative partial sum decompositions of the dependent variables. 
Additionally, a graphical depiction of the short- and long-run responses of the two 
commodities to positive and negative crude oil shocks can be feasible by 
implementing the asymmetric dynamic multipliers.  
 The empirical analysis of Cushing, OK WTI crude oil, Henry Hub natural gas 
and retail gasoline spot prices provided mixed evidence of asymmetric behavior in the 
under scrutiny cases. More specifically, the relationship between crude oil and natural 
gas prices proved to be symmetric in the long-run, yet short-run symmetry was 
rejected for the examined time period. In relevance to the price relationship of crude 
oil and retail gasoline, short-run asymmetry was found in the Italian market, while in 
the Spanish market there was strong evidence of both short- and long-run asymmetry. 
The rest of the countries (Greece, UK and US) presented a symmetric pass-through of 
crude oil to retail gasoline prices. Nevertheless, these conclusions have been drawn 
under the specific model and data frequency and they may be sensitive to changes in 
the methodology parameters. 
 It is also worth noting, although not presented here, that a further examination 
has been made regarding, this time, the pass-through process of natural gas to retail 
gasoline prices. Nevertheless, neither short- nor long-run asymmetries could be 
detected in the particular econometric analysis since gasoline is a fuel derived from 
crude oil and not natural gas. 
 The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 an exhaustive literature 
overview is offered by presenting a variety of papers which deal with the potential 
asymmetric or non-linear relationship between these energy commodities. Chapter 3 
describes the data and introduces the econometrical approach that will be applied. The 
results are presented and discussed in the subsequent chapter (Chapter 4). In Chapter 
5 some concluding remarks and future work proposals are presented. 
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2. Literature review 
 
The empirical literature that looks for evidence of asymmetries in the transmission 
mechanism of crude oil prices is extensive. Several studies have been developed by 
employing a variety of econometric regression models with the majority of them 
dealing with the gasoline market. The results differ across models, countries of 
investigation, stages of the market chain that are under scrutiny (production, 
wholesale or retail level), tax regimes and time periods of the data used and their 
frequency. Consequently, there cannot be an unambiguous rule stating that gasoline 
and natural gas prices or other macroeconomic variables, such as Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), respond asymmetrically to crude oil price changes. In the case that all 
studies provide evidence of asymmetries, that would mean a serious gap in the 
economic theory.  
In an exceptionally comprehensive work, Peltzman (2000) looked into a 
substantial number of markets, including 77 consumer and 165 producer goods. 
Monthly data for the period 1982-1996 were employed to both the Distributed Lags 
and the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. Peltzman (2000) deduced that two out 
of three US product markets suffered from asymmetric behavior, that is to say prices 
rise faster to positive shocks than they fall to negative ones. The asymmetry was 
intense in sectors with a wide wholesale distribution system, but not in the responses 
of atomistic markets, i.e. a supermarket chain. He, additionally, found out a negative 
correlation between the price volatility of input costs and the degree of asymmetry, as 
well as no relationship between the latter and inventory costs, market power and 
asymmetric menu costs.  
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) looked into the impacts of oil price 
shocks on the GDP of the main industrialized OECD countries (G-7, Norway and the 
euro area as a whole). They developed a multivariate VAR analysis by using both 
linear and non-linear models. The first one was a simple VAR and the rest consisted 
of an asymmetric, scaled and net specifications approach. The VAR model included 
relative variables, such as GDP, exchange rates, oil prices, inflation, real wages and 
even short- and long-term interest rates. The data were on quarterly frequency basis, 
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spanning the period 1972-2001. Asymmetry, even though statistically insignificant, 
was indeed found for the majority of the countries since a positive oil shock caused a 
larger increase in GDP than a decrease due to a negative one. More specifically, a rise 
of oil prices had a negative effect on the economic activity of oil importing countries 
(apart from Japan), while the results for the UK and Norway, which are net exporters, 
were contradictory (negative and positive effect, respectively). The non-linear 
approaches provided, as it was expected, proofer results, especially the scale 
specifications. The latter takes into account both oil price changes and the market 
volatility.  
In relevance to the pass-through of crude oil to gasoline prices, the first one 
who considered the issue of asymmetries in price increases and decreases was Bacon 
(1991). He studied the “rockets and feathers” effect by analyzing the speed of 
adjustment of retail gasoline prices to cost changes in the UK area using fortnightly 
data, spanning the period 1982-1989. Applying the non-linear quadratic partial 
adjustment model, Bacon (1991) found that when production costs rise, the 
adjustment by the firms is fast and, within two months, there is full transmission in 
the final product price. By contrast, in the case of cost reductions, an extra week is 
needed. However, he failed to reject that the retail gasoline market in the UK was 
under strong competition, due to the slight difference of one week. 
Karrenbrock (1991) studied the behavior of gasoline prices, as well. More 
specifically, he employed monthly data from January 1983 to December 1990 to 
estimate the relationship between after-tax US retail gasoline prices and wholesale 
prices. After applying the distributed lags methodology, he concluded that premium 
and unleaded regular gasoline retail prices are affected for two months by both 
wholesale price increases and decreases. Although the length of time is the same, the 
pattern is somewhat different. The bulk of the wholesale price changes affect the 
consumers sooner in price boosts than reductions. Nevertheless, decreases are 
ultimately passed along to customers as much as increases. In contrast, when 
wholesale prices for leaded regular gasoline fall, the response is slower by one month 
than when they rise. 
Shin (1994) dealt with the same issue of asymmetries in US oil products and 
emphasized that the results of each study varied due to different models and data that 
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were applied, especially at the distribution stage. He used the quadratic partial 
adjustment model for the period January 1986-March 1992 (on a monthly frequency 
base) and found no evidence of any asymmetry between crude oil and wholesale 
gasoline prices, namely at the transmission stage.  
Borenstein et al. (1997) examined the short-run dynamic asymmetric 
responses of US gasoline market to crude oil price changes using weekly and semi-
monthly data, spanning the period January 1986 to December 1992. With the 
assistance of the non-standard asymmetric Error Correction Model (ECM), they 
confirmed the common belief of asymmetry. Retail gasoline prices adjusted to oil 
increases in four weeks, while the respective time period for oil decreases was eight 
weeks. Additionally, the authors provided supportive three potential explanations of 
the asymmetric cost pass-through mechanism of gasoline prices. To begin with, when 
crude oil prices fall, firms tend to stick to a previous gasoline price until demand 
forces them to alter it. Thus, a natural focal point is formed in favor of oligopolistic 
sellers. Another source of asymmetry could be the production and inventory 
adjustment costs which allow a faster accommodation of negative shocks to gasoline 
future consumption than that of positive ones. Finally, consumer search behavior 
affects retail gasoline responses as well. For example, it is difficult for consumers to 
specify whether high gasoline prices are due to a potential oil price volatility which 
affects all retailers or if this is only for a number of individual firms. Therefore, they 
search less for cheaper prices, the demand elasticity decreases and retailers enjoy 
higher profit margins.  
Galeotti et al. (2003) coped with the issue of asymmetry in the gasoline market 
in a different way than the existing literature. Initially, updated monthly data from 
1985 to 2000 for five European countries were used: Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Spain. The asymmetries were separated into short- and long-run 
with the asymmetric ECM approach which was the same across all the countries in 
order for comparisons to be feasible. Subsequently, the authors investigated 
asymmetries not only in the distribution, but also in the production stage. Finally, they 
ran bootstrapped F-tests alongside with the conventional ones because the latter are 
not that suitable for a limited sample size. As a result, there was pronounced evidence 
of asymmetric responses to input increases and decreases across all countries, 
especially, in the distribution stage which is less competitive than the first stage.  
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In contrast with the literature published up to that point, Bachmeier and Griffin 
(2003) provided new evidence on the responses of gasoline prices to crude oil shocks. 
More specifically, they found that US wholesale spot gasoline prices responded 
asymmetrically to changes in crude oil costs for the time period 1985-1998. They 
introduced two novelties compared to previous studies, especially, to that of 
Borenstein et al. (1997) by using daily rather than weekly data and by adopting the 
standard Engle-Granger two-step estimation approach. The difference between 
positive and negative oil shocks was less than five cents of the dollar. Even with the 
same sample size, Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) not only failed to reject symmetry, 
but also their standard ECM specification produced better forecasts than the 
corresponding non-standard approach of Borenstein et al. (1997).   
Radchenko (2005a) studied the responses of US retail gasoline prices to 
variations of crude oil prices by introducing two innovations. He separated the cost 
changes to long- and short-term oil shocks and employed the hidden Markov-
switching model for weekly data from March 1991 to August 2002. He assumed that 
there is a different response of gasoline prices depending on the time length of the 
shock. His conclusion was that if a crude oil shock was viewed as short-term by 
market participants, there would be a certain lag in the cost pass-through to gasoline 
prices. Refineries do not make profits by changing the production and inventory levels 
immediately. There is only a partial adjustment of prices which reflects the 
anticipation of opposite price movements in the future. On the other hand, long-term 
shocks result in immediate responses of gasoline prices. It is, also, highlighted that the 
reason of long lags existence found by previous researchers may be due to the fact 
that almost 97% of crude oil shocks are presumed as short-term.  
Grasso and Manera (2007) emphasized the importance of applying the proper 
econometric approach for the investigation of a probable asymmetric relationship 
between crude oil and gasoline prices. They collected monthly data for France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom from January 1985 to March 2003 and 
imported them to three separate models: the “asymmetric ECM”, the “threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) ECM” and the “ECM with threshold cointegration”. All three 
of them indicated the presence of a certain delay and asymmetry in the cost pass-
through mechanism, yet the results varied depending on the country and the stage of 
the market chain. Long-run asymmetries, especially in the retail level, were found for 
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all countries by using the asymmetric ECM and the ECM with threshold cointegration 
methodology, with stronger evidence to be presented by the first one. The TAR ECM 
model was the most suitable for the exploration of short-run asymmetries at the 
distribution stage of the transmission chain.  
Al-Gudhea et al. (2007) approached the issue of asymmetry in the US gasoline 
market from an innovative perspective. They used the Momentum Threshold 
Autoregressive (M-TAR) process for daily data from December 1998 to January 2004 
and investigated for pair-wise asymmetric adjustment from the beginning of the 
distribution chain (crude oil, spot, wholesale, and retail level). However, instead of 
implementing the common monetary 1$ innovations, the authors distinguished them 
to typical and unusually large crude oil shocks. The results indicated symmetric 
responses to large shocks for all stages except for the retail level, while any 
asymmetries decayed quickly. For small shocks, downstream prices responded 
differently to positive and negative upstream prices, as a consequence of consumer 
search costs and the restricted market power of the retailers.  
The majority of the researchers so far have used VAR or ECM approaches 
which determine the asymmetric relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices by 
deriving the speed of adjustment and the short-run adjustment coefficients. Honarvar 
(2009) stressed the need of including the long-run equilibrium, as well. He used the 
Crouching Error Correction Model (CECM), a non-linear hidden cointegration 
technique, for monthly data from September 1981 to December 2007 in the US 
gasoline market. Evidence of cointegration was found between the cumulative 
positive changes of crude oil prices and the corresponding negative components of 
gasoline prices. Market power of refiners and collusion are no longer reasons for 
long-run asymmetries. On the contrary, long-run gasoline prices were more affected 
by technological improvements on the demand side, rather than crude oil prices 
variation on the supply side.  
Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) tested for a potential asymmetric pricing 
behavior in Irish and UK petrol and diesel markets. They developed an ECM-TAR 
model for monthly retail and refined oil prices from 1997 to 2009. Firms alter prices 
when input costs changes are sizeable enough to justify the cost of adjustment. This is 
the reason that a non-zero threshold was used. The latter has to be accurate and 
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economically and statistically significant. The results showed no evidence of 
asymmetry despite the common belief that retail prices react faster in crude oil 
increases than decreases. The authors attributed this finding to the high degree of 
competition in the particular retail fuel markets and the consequent modest profit 
margins. Additionally, Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) highlighted the importance 
of specifying the appropriate number of possible regimes. In this way, they could 
consider the price pressures not only from the ECM term, but also from a threshold 
variable. The asymmetries that were found in some of the cases, although statistically 
significant, were not important to be considered from an economic point of view.  
Clerides (2010) investigated the correlation of weekly retail fuel prices 
(unleaded gasoline and diesel oil) and crude oil across European Union (EU) 
countries for the time period January 2000 to March 2010. He made use of the ECM 
methodology proposed by Borenstein et al. (1997) in which both short- and long-term 
price adjustments are considered. Moreover, final retail prices were separated into two 
categories, these with all taxes included and without them. He focused on three major 
issues: the symmetric case, the rate, and the speed of adjustment. Although there was 
a delay on the pass-through mechanism from crude oil price variations to unleaded 
gasoline and diesel, for most of the European countries, no evidence of any 
asymmetry was found. Only a small number of countries, like Cyprus, presented a 
weak asymmetric behavior, yet it was not economically significant. The author 
concluded that any additional profits firms may take advantage of from asymmetric 
pricing are low and temporary. Furthermore, symmetry in the market does not induce 
the desired level of competition. It depends on the firms’ return on capital which for 
permanent deviations from the “normal” levels could be huge.  
L’oeilett and Lantz (2010) examined the asymmetric transmission from crude 
oil to retail fuel prices. They investigated the responses of gasoline, heating oil and 
diesel prices in France and Germany by using the asymmetric ECM methodology for 
weekly data from January 1998 to October 2008. Unlike the majority of previous 
studies, not only have they distinguished the transmission chain to refinery and 
distribution chain, but also the role of exchange rate was involved. Asymmetry was 
found for both countries in the diesel market, but their conclusions were contradictory 
for heating oil. This dissimilar cost pass-through mechanism was more intense at the 
refinery stage than it was at the distribution stage. Despite the held belief and the 
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results of the previous literature, no evidence of asymmetry was proved in the 
responses of gasoline market. Additionally, the appreciation of the national currency 
seemed to attenuate the effect of crude oil shocks to retail prices, whilst the 
depreciation had no effect at all. The authors also explained the reasons of 
asymmetries which, in summary, were inventories and production costs, market 
power of retailers and imperfect competition and consumer search costs.   
A problem that may be addressed in previous studies (Borenstein et al., 1997; 
Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003; Radchenko, 2005a; Honarvar, 2009) is the incorporation 
of only two coefficients which represent the speed of adjustment, namely the positive 
and negative deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The responses of retail prices 
may be different to large or small shocks. Valdkhani (2013) took also into account the 
magnitude of disequilibria. The area of his investigation was 111 locations of the 
Australian retail gasoline market and its responses to wholesale price changes. He 
employed weekly data which cover the period from October 2007 to January 2012 to 
an asymmetric ECM model. The ECM term was separated in large positive, large 
negative and small positive/negative deviations. The results for 28 locations were in 
accordance with Bacon (1991) who first demonstrated evidence of asymmetry in 
gasoline prices, while in 31 locations the opposite effect was obtained. This means 
that in 25% of the locations in Australia, if wholesale prices are considerably below 
the optimal market equilibrium, there will be a quicker price adjustment by retailers 
than if the prices were above this value.  
De Salles (2014) examined the asymmetric relationship between crude oil and 
gasoline prices for a considerable number of countries. These were Brazil, the US, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the UK. The author ran both 
causality and cointegration tests and error correction mechanisms when the latter 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of cointegration. The time span of 
the data was from June 2006 until April 2013 and the observations had weekly 
frequency. Additionally, he utilized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH), generalized ARCH (GARCH), integrated ARCH (IGARCH) and 
exponential GARCH models to estimate the variance of price returns. The results 
indicated both asymmetry and cointegration between the variables across all 
countries. However, the author argued that these conclusions varied depending on the 
data and the methodologies that were taken into account.  
 11 
Atil et al. (2014) made use of the recently developed NARDL model to 
investigate the pass-through of the crude oil prices to the US gasoline and natural gas 
market. This methodology allows for both short- and long-run non-linearities testing 
by decomposing the dependent variables into positive and negative partial sum 
decompositions. A quantification of the responses to positive and negative oil shocks 
is also feasible through the asymmetric dynamic multipliers. In other words, the 
dynamic adjustment of gasoline and natural gas prices from the old to the new 
equilibrium is observed. The authors used monthly data from January 1997 until 
September 2012. The non-stationarity of the price levels was an appropriate element 
of the NARDL methodology. The results indicated an asymmetric short-run 
relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices and a corresponding long-run for 
natural gas prices. Moreover, there was a significantly greater impact on gasoline and 
natural gas values to oil decreases than increases. The oil price reduction affects in a 
positive way the budget of consumers and producers for the purchase of these fuels. 
The long-run equilibrium for oil and gasoline is restored after 8 months. Contrariwise, 
natural gas prices are more persistent to oil pass-through and additional time is needed 
for the convergence to long-run multipliers. They concluded that the quicker response 
of gasoline is due to the fact that it was formulated directly from crude oil. 
Furthermore, natural gas may have a slower response because it refers to a more 
regional market, while crude oil is internationally traded. Finally, the researchers 
issued the importance of these results for policy making, speculators, commodity 
investments and energy risk hedging.  
As far as the reasons of asymmetric behavior is concerned, a considerable 
number of papers have been published in an attempt of the researchers to investigate 
the potential factors that urge downward prices to respond in a dissimilar way to 
positive and negative upward price changes. 
Lewis (2004) proposed an alternative methodology regarding the asymmetric 
price adjustment of the retail gasoline market. He developed a “reference search 
model” whereby consumers’ price expectations depend on previous gasoline prices 
that have been observed or purchased. The discrepancy between Lewis’s methodology 
and previous published studies (e.g. Borenstein et al. (1997) and L’oeilett and Lantz 
(2010) who also mentioned some possible reasons of asymmetry) relies on the fact 
that consumers are practically not provided with full knowledge of retail and 
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wholesale gasoline prices. As a result, firms set a higher price and individuals’ gains 
by searching the necessary information are not significant. Lewis (2004) concluded 
that the margin size is the main determinant of the asymmetric price speed of 
adjustment rather than the upward or downward direction of cost changes. For 
instance, if a consumer observes a certain low gasoline price, his/her search of a lower 
one will be reduced. The demand then becomes more inelastic and firms face less 
competition. Consequently, they can set higher prices and take advantage of the 
higher profit margins for as much time as they can. By contrast, cost increases result 
in more search and low margins and, therefore, in a faster response.  
Radchenko (2005b) examined the relationship between oil price volatility and 
asymmetric effects in the gasoline market. He tested three potential explanations of 
the dissimilar responses of US retail gasoline prices to crude oil price ups and downs: 
the “standard search theory”, the “search theory with Bayesian updating” and the 
“oligopolistic coordination theory”. The first one states that a raise of the oil price 
volatility leads to less search by consumers and to a growth of retailers’ market 
power, therefore, to asymmetric increase. Contrariwise, the results, which were 
derived using a VAR model for weekly data from March 1991 to February 2003, 
supported the other two theories. There was a negative correlation between oil price 
volatility and gasoline price asymmetry. More specifically, the asymmetry decrease 
due to an increase in the volatility of oil prices is based on a sooner adjustment of 
retail gasoline prices after a negative oil shock. The latter is explained by the 
oligopolistic coordination theory to which Radchenko (2005b) concluded as the 
reason of the asymmetric behavior of the gasoline market.  
Tappata (2009) formalized a consumer search model in an attempt to prove 
that collusion among firms, the government and the media is not sufficient to explain 
the asymmetric behavior of several products. The latter could happen both in highly 
competitive and non-cooperative markets. The author provided a theoretical 
explanation of this issue and deduced that asymmetry in firms’ cost pass-through 
procedure was explained by two aspects: firms’ production costs and lack of full 
information from the consumers’ side. According to economic theory, ignorance in 
the market leads to temporary profits for firms. For instance, if the current marginal 
cost is high, consumers expect it to remain high and their search activity declines. 
Thus, in a situation of small cost reduction, firms earn by keeping the price high for a 
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short time period. On the other hand, when the marginal cost is low and rises in the 
future, consumers intensify their searching process. Firms now have an incentive to 
raise the prices immediately in order not to experience any losses.  
Cabral and Fishman (2012) developed a search theoretic methodology in an 
attempt to prove not only that consumer prices are sticky to cost changes, but they 
also respond in an asymmetric manner. The authors considered a model where 
consumer search costs could lead to output prices which are stickier than an industry’s 
input costs. As a matter of fact, if a firm’s costs change slightly, then it is in firm’s 
favor not to alter the price. In this way, consumers hold back their searching activity 
because of their belief of no cost shocks. By contrast, a change in the price will urge 
consumers to search for a better offer in rival companies, an action which outweighs 
potential profits from the price adjustment to a new equilibrium. They found an 
asymmetric pricing behavior as well, i.e. the price adjustment is faster to cost 
increases than decreases. A small rise in input costs results in a slight price growth. 
Consumers expect other firms to act in the same way and search less for more 
advantageous prices. On the other hand, firms fear the induction of consumer 
searching and do not change the product’s price in the case of a small cost reduction.  
As can be seen so far, a vast literature has been published regarding the 
asymmetric or not relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices. However, a 
definite rule cannot be established since the conclusions are far from unanimous. 
Perdiguero-Garcia (2010) attempted to study this variability of results. He 
accomplished a meta-analysis approach by introducing a broader dataset and new 
variables. The dependent variable was a dummy which takes the value of 1 if in a 
study asymmetric behavior has been proved, and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables had to do with the type of asymmetry, the year of publication, the industry 
sector that a study analyzed, the number of examined years, the type of fuel, the 
geographical area, taxes, the quality and quantity of the data and the model and 
estimator that were used. All these elements could explain the diverse results in the 
empirical literature. Evidence of asymmetry is less likely to be found in more recent 
articles, in studies that investigate the first stages of the transmission mechanism and 
in these whereby a great number of observations or monthly frequency have been 
used. By contrast, an analysis of the last stage of the industry, the use of the maximum 
likelihood estimator or the geographical aggregation of the data at the country level 
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could lead to asymmetries. Perdiguero-Garcia (2010) concluded that there might be 
some publication bias towards the studies in which asymmetric responses have been 
observed.   
Another relationship which is of crucial interest is that between crude oil and 
natural gas, with which several researchers have dealt, focusing either on the linear or 
the non-linear relationship of these two fuels. Again, the results have been sensitive to 
changes of the dataset and its frequency, the region of investigation and the model 
specification.  
Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz (2004) studied the shared trends and cycles between 
natural gas and crude oil in the North American market. They used an autoregressive 
distributed lags (ARDL) model and a bounds testing approach for the investigation of 
a potential long-run relationship. The examined variables were the WTI crude oil and 
US Henry Hub natural gas prices from January 1991 until April 2001 and they were 
extracted on daily frequency. The results indicated a decoupling from the regular 
equilibrium, as a consequence of the recent deregulation of the oil and natural gas 
markets, and the hypothesis of similar trends was rejected.  
Crude oil and natural gas prices are variables which contain a unit root. Thus, 
applying approaches like simple correlations and deterministic trends in order to 
investigate their historical relationship may lead to spurious conclusions. Villar and 
Joutz (2006) implemented a bivariate vector error correction model (VECM) which 
covered the period January 1991 to December 2005 and proved that WTI crude oil 
and Henry Hub natural gas prices share a long-run cointegrating relationship. 
Additionally, a 1-month temporary shock of 20% magnitude to oil can cause a 5% 
effect on natural gas prices. The latter is decreased to 2% within 2 months. There was 
clear unidirectional causal relationship from crude oil to natural gas. The reason is 
that oil refers to an international market, whilst US natural gas is traded in a more 
domestic one and can not affect world prices. As far as the natural gas demand side is 
concerned, an increase in oil prices leads to an increase both of the demand and the 
natural gas prices because the two fuels are substitutes and consumers prefer the most 
economical solution. The results for a positive oil shock from the supply side were 
ambiguous since a rise of oil prices could lead both in a boom and a reduction of 
natural gas prices. The short-run inelasticity of natural gas supply causes a dominant 
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effect of oil to the first. The authors concluded that there was a stable and statistically 
significant long-run relationship between these two products, despite the time periods 
of large spikes that one or both of them experienced which temporarily ruined the 
common trend.   
Brown and Yücel (2007) presented two simple rules of thumbs that are used in 
the energy industry for natural gas pricing. The first one states that there is a 10-1 
relationship between the price of a barrel of crude oil and one million British Thermal 
Units (BTUs) of natural gas. This ratio is declined to 6-1 in the second rule of thumb 
because a barrel of WTI crude oil contains 5.825 million BTUs. However, neither of 
the rules is suitable to define the relationship of the two fuels over the last three 
decades, because they over- and under-forecast, respectively, natural gas prices. It was 
also observed that when there was an upward trend for both prices, the 10-1 rule was 
displaced by the 6-1 ratio. In contrast, the first rule of thumb seems to explain better 
the correlation of the two in the case of negative shocks. Additionally, the authors 
made use of an ECM approach with weekly data from January 1997 to July 2006 and 
indicated that there was a long-run relationship between crude oil and natural gas 
prices, despite the short-run variations, a conclusion that is in accordance with the 
study by Villar and Joutz (2006). In the case of a temporary decoupling, natural gas 
prices adjust to oil price changes in a rate of 8% per week, causing the gap to narrow 
within a very short time period. Weather, seasonality, natural gas storage, inventory 
levels and other additional factors were taken into account as well.   
Aloui et al. (2014) examined the non-linear connections between crude oil and 
natural gas. They studied the extreme co-movements between the prices of the two 
fuels as well as the degree and nature of relative dependence during bullish and 
bearish periods and their implications on volatility forecasting. The applied 
methodology was the copula-GARCH model and the relative daily prices covered the 
period from January 1997 to October 2011. The results indicated that the long-run 
relationship between WTI crude oil and Henry Hub natural gas prices was 
strengthened during bull market phases when economic growth and demand tended to 
increase, something that was not applied in the corresponding bear periods. The 
researchers attributed this situation to four possible reasons. First of all, arbitrageurs 
take advantage of profit opportunities during bullish, rather than bearish periods. 
Moreover, consumers react faster when the prices of crude oil and natural gas are in 
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high levels. A third cause is the fact that in periods with strong economic growth, the 
demand for all fuels tends to move up, contrary to times with financial and physical 
crises when the demand magnitude is significantly reduced. Finally, the natural gas 
market requires heavy investments for its transmission and distribution system, for 
which longer-term contracts are required. They utilized the extreme value copula-
GARCH (EVC-GARCH) model as well. The latter helped them to measure in a more 
precise manner the Value at Risk (VaR), which is an instrument of assessing the 
maximum losses of a number of investments, that is to say the portfolio risk.  
Summarizing, the vast majority of the articles deal with US and selected 
European countries. The most common examined time periods are the 1980s and 
1990s and only some of the most recent studies made use of updated data. The 
frequency of the variables has been either weekly or monthly, although fortnightly 
data were employed in some of the cases. Most of the researchers approached the 
issue of asymmetry in the latest stage of the transmission mechanism, that is to say the 
responses of retail prices to wholesale price changes, and only few looked this into on 
the refinery level. The econometric methodologies that have been used depend on the 
author and how he/she needed to approach the subject. This is the main reason of the 
diversity of the results as far as the asymmetric behavior of a variable is concerned. 
Latest developments in econometric models were applied only in a few recent studies, 
in which both short- and long-run asymmetric pricing effects were tested and 
estimated. As far as the connection between crude oil and natural gas is concerned, it 
seems that the two fuels share a long-run cointegrating relationship, although the latter 
depends on the applied model, the dataset and the nature of the economy. In Table 1 
below, all the examined studies and their results are summarized in chronological 
order.       
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Table 1: Summary of the literature review (in chronological order) 
Study Country Product Sample Frequency Methodology Conclusions 
Bacon (1991) UK 
Retail 
gasoline 
1982-
1989 
Biweekly 
Non-linear 
quadratic partial 
adjustment model 
Asymmetry: slower 
adjustment to decreases than 
increases by one week. 
Karrenbrock 
(1991) 
US 
After-tax 
retail 
gasoline 
1983-
1990 
Monthly ARDL 
Symmetry for premium and 
unleaded regular, asymmetry 
for leaded regular. 
Shin (1994) US 
Wholesale 
gasoline 
1986-
1992 
Monthly 
Quadratic partial 
adjustment model 
No evidence of asymmetry. 
Borenstein et 
al. (1997) 
US 
Retail 
gasoline 
1986-
1992 
Weekly and 
biweekly 
Non-standard 
asymmetric ECM 
Asymmetry: slower 
adjustment to decreases than 
increases by four weeks. 
Peltzman 
(2000) 
US 
77 consumer 
and 165 
producer 
goods 
1982-
1996 
Monthly VAR and ARDL 
Asymmetry in sectors with 
wide distribution system. 
Galeotti et. al 
(2003) 
DE, FR, 
UK, IT, SP 
Wholesale 
and retail 
gasoline 
1985-
2000 
Monthly Asymmetric ECM 
Asymmetry for all countries, 
especially at the distribution 
stage. 
Bachmeier & 
Griffin 
(2003) 
US 
Wholesale 
gasoline 
1985-
1998 
Daily 
ECM with SR 
asymmetry 
No evidence of asymmetry. 
Lewis (2004) US 
Retail 
gasoline 
2000-
2001 
Weekly 
Reference price 
search model 
The margin size is the main 
determinant of the 
asymmetric speed of 
adjustment. 
Jimenez-
Rodriguez 
and Sanchez 
(2004) 
OECD 
countries 
 
1972-
2001 
Quarterly VAR 
Asymmetry of GDP 
responses to oil shocks for 
the majority of the countries.  
Serletis and 
Rangel-Ruiz 
(2004) 
North 
America 
Natural gas 
1991-
2001 
Daily ARDL 
Decoupling of the regular 
equilibrium. 
Radchenko 
(2005a) 
US 
Retail 
gasoline 
1991-
2002 
Weekly 
Hidden Markov-
switching model 
Responses depend on the 
shock time length. 
Radchenko 
(2005b) 
US 
Retail 
gasoline 
1991-
2003 
Weekly VAR 
Asymmetry is explained by 
the oligopolistic coordination 
theory. 
Villar and 
Joutz (2006) 
US Natural gas 
1991-
2005 
Monthly VECM 
WTI crude oil and Henry 
Hub natural gas prices share 
a LR cointegrating 
relationship. 
Brown and 
Yücel (2007) 
US Natural gas 
1997-
2006 
Weekly ECM 
WTI crude oil and Henry 
Hub natural gas prices share 
a LR cointegrating 
relationship. 
Grasso & 
Manera 
(2007) 
FR, DE, 
IT, SP, UK 
Wholesale 
and retail 
gasoline 
1985-
2003 
Monthly 
Asymmetric ECM, 
TAR ECM, ECM 
with threshold 
cointegration 
SR and LR asymmetry, 
depending on the country 
and the market stage. 
     (Table 1 continues on next page) 
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Study Country Product Sample Frequency Methodology Conclusions 
Al-Gudhea et 
al. (2007) 
US 
Wholesale 
and retail 
gasoline 
1998-
2004 
Daily M-TAR 
Asymmetry at retail level 
which decayed quickly. 
Honarvar 
(2009) 
US 
Retail 
gasoline 
1981-
2007 
Monthly CECM 
LR gasoline prices are more 
affected by technological 
improvement. 
Tappata 
(2009) 
    
Consumer search 
model 
Asymmetry due to firms’ 
production costs and 
consumers’ lack of 
information. 
Bermingham 
& O’Brien 
(2010) 
IR, UK 
Retail petrol 
and diesel 
1997-
2009 
Monthly TAR ECM No evidence of asymmetry. 
Clerides 
(2010) 
EU 
Retail 
unleaded 
gasoline and 
diesel oil 
2000-
2010 
Weekly 
Non-standard 
asymmetric ECM 
No evidence of asymmetry. 
L’oeilett & 
Lantz (2010) 
DE, FR 
Retail 
gasoline, 
heating oil 
and diesel 
1998-
2008 
Weekly 
Non-standard 
asymmetric ECM 
No evidence of asymmetry 
for gasoline, asymmetry in 
the diesel market, 
contradictory results for 
heating oil. 
Perdiguero-
Garcia 
(2010) 
    
Meta-analysis 
approach 
Evidence of asymmetry in 
recent studies which 
investigate early stages. 
Cabral and 
Fishman 
(2012) 
    
Search theoretic 
model 
Evidence of asymmetry. 
Valdkhani 
(2013) 
AUS 
Retail 
gasoline 
2007-
2012 
Weekly 
Non-standard 
asymmetric ECM 
Evidence of asymmetry in 
25% of the locations. 
De Salles 
(2014) 
BR, US, 
BE, FR, 
DE, IT, 
NL, UK 
Retail 
gasoline 
2006-
2013 
Weekly 
ECM, ARCH, 
GARCH, 
IGARCH, 
exponential 
GARCH 
Evidence of asymmetry and 
cointegration. 
Atil et al. 
(2014) 
US 
Retail 
gasoline and 
natural gas 
1997-
2012 
Monthly NARDL 
SR asymmetry for gasoline, 
LR asymmetry for natural 
gas. 
Aloui et al. 
(2014) 
 Natural gas 
1997-
2011 
Daily 
Copula-GARCH 
model 
The LR relationship between 
WTI crude oil and Henry 
Hub natural gas prices was 
strengthened during bull 
market phases. 
Note: AUS=Australia, BE=Belgium, BR=Brazil, DE=Germany, EU= European Union, FR=France, IR=Ireland, IT=Italy 
NL=Netherlands, SP=Spain, UK=United Kingdom, US= United States of America, OECD=Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
 
 
  
 19 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The applied methodology will be within the Non-Linear Autoregressive Distributed 
Lags (NARDL) modeling approach proposed by Shin et al. (2011) and it will be 
bivariate, implying that there will be a separate examination for the two pairs of 
variables (crude oil-natural gas prices and crude oil-gasoline prices). An international 
comparison will be held among five countries, namely Greece, for which no relative 
investigation has been carried out, Italy, Spain, UK and US. The last four countries, 
and especially the US, have been thoroughly examined, yet it would be interesting to 
compare the estimated results with the ones of the previous published literature. Crude 
oil and natural gas prices are on international basis. As a result, the differences across 
the countries lie on the diverse gasoline prices.   
3.1 Data 
The variables used in this study consist of spot prices for Cushing, OK WTI crude oil 
measured in US dollars per barrel (US $/bbl), spot prices for Henry Hub natural gas 
measured in US dollars per million Btu (US $/Mbtu) and retail gasoline prices 
measured in US dollars per liter (US $/l). The frequency of the observations is weekly 
and all prices are log-transformed in order for the intensity of heteroscedasticity to be 
reduced. If the time interval was larger, e.g. monthly data, there would be a possibility 
of missing the price adjustments that happen within a few weeks. Crude oil and 
natural gas prices were obtained from US EIA2 and gasoline prices from Bloomberg3. 
The transformation of the national currencies to US dollars was carried out directly 
from the Bloomberg database. The spanning period is right after the burst of the 
global financial crisis, viz. from January 2009 until July 2016. Due to data 
unavailability, the sample of the Greek retail gasoline prices begins from September 
2009. Additionally, log-linear interpolation was used in the case of single missing 
values (e.g. due to holidays). Thus, this work focuses on what has happened thereafter 
since undesirable price spikes which occurred during 2007 and 2008 and may 
influence the results were eliminated. 
                                                          
2 For more details see at: http://www.eia.gov/ 
3 For more details see at: http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
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 Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics and the stochastic properties 
of the crude oil and natural gas price time series alongside with the results of the 
normality test. The price of crude oil has an average value of 78.32 $/bbl and reaches 
a peak of 112.3 $/bbl in the last days of April 2011 due to the Arab Spring and the 
civil war in Syria and the growing demand in emerging markets, mainly in China and 
the Middle East. The data do not follow the normal distribution since the skewness 
coefficient is negative (fatter tail in the left side) and the kurtosis coefficient equals to 
2.05, which indicates a platykurtic distribution. The above are confirmed from the 
Jarque-Bera test which rejects the null hypothesis of normality.  
As far as natural gas prices is concerned, the mean value is 3.57 $/Mbtu and 
the maximum is 6.56 $/Mbtu in January 2010. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients 
signify normal distribution which is also corroborated from the Jarque-Bera test.  
   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and tests for crude oil and natural gas 
Statistics Crude oil Natural gas 
Mean 78.320 3.577 
Maximum 112.300 6.560 
Minimum 28.140 1.570 
Standard Deviation 22.206 0.945 
Skewness -0.579 0.213 
Kurtosis 2.054 3.014 
JB test 
36.820 
[0.000] 
3.012 
[0.221] 
Observations 395 395 
Note: The JB statistic stands for the Jarque-Bera test for normality. The p-values of the statistical test 
are in square parentheses. Bold numbers indicate rejection of the null hypotheses of normality. 
 
The price variations of crude oil and natural gas prices through time are demonstrated 
in Figure 1. From January 2009 until June 2012 the two variables do not share a 
common cycle. Crude oil prices present an upward trend with minor fluctuations 
whilst natural gas prices oscillate at approximately 4 Mbtu/$ with a standard deviation 
of less than 1 Mbtu/$ in most of the weeks. From mid 2012 and onwards, the 
historical cointegrating relationship between the two commodities seems to be 
restored. More specifically, the prices of both have dropped significantly within the 
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last two years, reaching at a minimum level for the specific sample in February 2016 
before they start increasing again a little. This significant drop of the prices in 2014 
could be attributed to several reasons, according to Arnsdorf (2014). Firstly, oil 
demand of emerging economies, such as China, Russia, India and Brazil, started to 
decline after the initial burst of their economic growth during the 2000s. At the same 
time, the new technology of fracking caused an increase of crude oil production in the 
US and Canada, resulting in less imports and, consequently, in downward pressure of 
international prices. Finally, although prices kept decreasing, Middle East countries 
kept the oil supply at the initial high levels in order to maintain their high market 
shares. In this way, they can increase the pressure on countries which use the fracking 
technology, as the latter becomes no longer affordable under these low prices. 
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Figure 1: Weekly crude oil and natural gas prices 
 
The descriptive statistics and the stochastic properties of retail gasoline prices for each 
country are illustrated in Table 3. US consumers pay 0.83 $/l on average which is less 
than the half than the price of the rest of the countries which are approximately 1.64 
$/l for Spain, 1.90 $/l for UK and just over 2 $/l for Greece and Italy. According to 
Bloomberg, the reason of the low US pump prices is twofold. Not only oil production 
is subsidized by the government, but also the taxes imposed on fuel are significantly 
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lower than in other countries, where the tax may be greater than the average US retail 
price itself. The geopolitical reasons that drove crude oil prices at a peak in April 
2011 affected the gasoline market of all countries, as well. Prices in the US, Greece 
and Spain reached a maximum of 1.08 $/l, 2.48 $/l and 1.99 $/l, respectively. The 
corresponding value for Italy was approximately 2.48 $/l in September 2012, which 
was a result of a rise in fuel taxes in an effort of the government to cope with the huge 
public dept. The increasing demand in the UK after the start of the second quarter of 
2012 led the gasoline prices at a peak of 2.30 $/l in April 2012. The US market 
exhibits the lowest price variability (just over 0.15 $/l), while the standard deviation 
of the rest European gasoline markets ranges between 0.25 $/l and 0.31 $/l, with the 
highest dispersion being presented in Greece. All skewness coefficients are negative 
signifying fatter tails in the left side of the distribution. The corresponding values for 
kurtosis are less than 3 (platykurtic distribution). Hence, the normality is rejected for 
all cases after the implementation of the Jarque-Bera test.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and tests for gasoline prices 
Statistics US Greece Italy Spain UK 
Mean 0.838 2.019 2.008 1.645 1.904 
Maximum 1.084 2.482 2.479 1.993 2.301 
Minimum 0.465 1.422 1.458 1.111 1.193 
Standard Deviation 0.154 0.312 0.297 0.251 0.267 
Skewness -0.337 -0.444 -0.158 -0.333 -0.563 
Kurtosis 1.947 1.700 1.565 1.779 2.285 
JB test 
25.726 
[0.000] 
37.199 
[0.000] 
35.414 
[0.000] 
31.762 
[0.000] 
29.284 
[0.000] 
Observations 395 360 395 395 395 
Note: The JB statistic stands for the Jarque-Bera test for normality. The p-values of the statistical test 
are in square parentheses. Bold numbers indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of normality. 
 
The price variations of both crude oil and gasoline prices are illustrated in Figure 2. 
From January 2009 until the moment of the peak in April 2011, all variables presented 
a steady common upward trend with only minor fluctuations. From this point till the 
mid of 2014, the prices remained at significantly high levels, yet with greater ups and 
downs. For the reasons that mentioned above, crude oil prices have dropped more 
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than the half the last two years, something that inevitably affected gasoline prices in 
each country and in a negative way.  
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Figure 2: Weekly crude oil and gasoline prices for each country 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The following form (Equation 1) presents the traditional linear ECM specification 
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) in which short- and long-run asymmetric 
behavior are not taken into account.  
p 1 q 1
t y t 1 wti t 1 i t i i t 1 t
i 1 i 0
y y wti y wti     
 
   
 
            (1) 
In this dissertation, wtit refers to the Cushing, OK WTI spot prices, while yt stands for 
either Henry Hub natural gas spot prices (ngt) or the retail gasoline prices (gast). The 
symbol Δ signifies first differences and p and q are the lag orders of the dependent and 
independent variables. Despite the fact that the separation of short- and long-run 
variations is considered, this methodology provides profoundly misleading results 
when it comes for non-linearities and asymmetries in the price transmission 
mechanism of the particular energy commodities. In contrast, the NARDL 
econometric model allows for the investigation of these characteristics by 
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decomposing the independent variable wtit into partial sum processes of increases and 
decreases (wti+ and wti-). 
t t t t
t j j t j j
j 1 j 1 j 1 j 1
wti wti max( wti ,0) , wti wti min( wti ,0)   
   
            
The partial sum processes of pοsitive and negative changes in wtit are more explicitly 
demonstrated in Figure 3 below. As expected, they follow an exact opposite trend 
throughout the sample period. 
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Figure 3: Partial sum decompositions of crude oil prices (log transformed) 
 
By extending the ARDL approach proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran 
et al. (2001), a more general cointegrating methodology is created by introducing 
combined short- and long-run dynamics (Equation 2). 
t y t 1 wti t 1 wti t 1
p 1 q 1
i t i i t i i t i t
i 1 i 0
y y wti wti
      y ( wti wti )
   
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
       
   (2) 
The superscripts (+) and (-) represent the positive and negative partial sum 
decompositions of lagged levels and first differences of crude oil prices. The optimal 
lag length for p and q can be obtained with the assistance of the Akaike information 
criteria. The coefficients βi+ and βi- capture the short-run adjustment of natural gas or 
gasoline prices to crude oil shocks.  
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 The following step is to test for a cointegrating long-run relationship between 
the variables yt, wtit
+ and wtit
 -. Initially, the Banerjee et al. (1998) t-test is followed, 
testing ρy = 0 against ρy < 0 in (2). Next, the pragmatic bounds-testing procedure will 
be applied which was derived by Pesaran et al. (2001). It is an F-test under the joint 
null hypothesis, ρy = ρwti+ = ρwti - = 0. The advantage of this method is that it is valid 
“irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually 
cointegrated”. These two tests are denoted as tBDM and FPSS, respectively.  The critical 
value bounds for both of them depend on the number of regressors, k. In the case of 
long-run asymmetry where the long-run relationship is determined by yt, wtit
+ and 
wtit
-, the value of k ranges between 1 (more conservative tests) and 2. 
After establishing the long-run relationship between the variables, potential 
asymmetric effects should be investigated in order for the hypothesis testing and the 
estimation results to be robust and not misspecified. The short-run symmetry can be 
tested by employing a Wald test under the null hypothesis H0: 
q 1 q 1
i i
i 0 i 0
,      for i=0,1, ,q-1 
 
 
 
    
The long-run symmetry is also tested through a Wald test. The null hypothesis is 
presented below: 
wti wti
y y
,      where θ  and θ
 
 
 
 
         
In the case that both null hypotheses fail to be rejected, the model of Equation 2 is 
transformed to the traditional linear ECM (Equation 1), meaning that no asymmetry is 
detected between the two variables. If only short- or long-run symmetry is rejected, 
the model is reduced to the cointegrating NARDL with short- or long-run asymmetry, 
respectively (Equations 3 and 4).  
t y t 1 wti t 1
p 1 q 1
i t i i t i i t i t
i 1 i 0
y y wti
      y ( wti wti )
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
       
   (3) 
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t y t 1 wti t 1 wti t 1
p 1 q 1
i t i i t i t
i 1 i 0
y y wti wti
      y wti
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
    
     
    (4) 
The responses of natural gas and gasoline prices to positive and negative crude oil 
price shocks can be quantified through the asymmetric dynamic multipliers as 
follows: 
h h
t j t j
h h
j 0 j 0
y y
m    and   m  ,    h=0,1,2,
wti wti
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
By construction, when h hh ,  m  and m 
      , where    and   are the 
asymmetric long-run coefficients as presented above. Consequently, it is feasible to 
observe not only the path from the old to the new equilibrium after a positive or a 
negative shock but also the corresponding duration of the temporary disequilibria.  
 Additionally, Shin et al. (2011)  highlighted the fact that through the NARDL 
model three types of asymmetry can be considered: the “long-run or reaction 
asymmetry” (   ), the “impact asymmetry”, which is associated with the unequal 
coefficients of the contemporaneous first differences of crude oil prices, and the 
“adjustment asymmetry”, which is derived from the interaction of the first two and is 
captured by the dynamic multipliers.  
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4. Empirical results 
 
Although the application of the NARDL model can be implemented regardless the 
order of integration of the series, the bounds testing procedure for cointegration 
requires that no I(2) variables will be involved since, otherwise, the estimated 
statistics will be invalid. Thus, the Dickey-Fuller-GLS unit root test, proposed by 
Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1992) as a modification of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1979) test, is employed to each time series. The corresponding findings are 
presented in Table 4. As can be seen, all examined variables have, at least, one unit 
root at the 5% significance level. After applying first differences, though, they 
become stationary and do not cause any complication in the examination of a potential 
long-run relationship between crude oil and natural gas and crude oil and retail 
gasoline prices.   
 
Table 4: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests with GLS detrending 
Variables  
(levels) 
t-Statistic 
Variables 
(1st differences) 
t-Statistic 
wtit 
-0.697 
[0.486] 
Δwtit 
-14.473 
[0.000] 
ngt 
-2.808 
[0.005] 
Δngt 
-16.263 
[0.000] 
gast – Greece 
-0.783 
[0.433] 
Δgast – Greece 
-14.404 
[0.000] 
gast – Italy 
-0.554 
[0.579] 
Δgast – Italy 
-15.228 
[0.000] 
gast – Spain 
-0.596 
[0.551] 
Δgast – Spain 
-6.557 
[0.000] 
gast – UK 
-0.335 
[0.737] 
Δgast – UK 
-4.117 
[0.000] 
gast – US 
-0.827 
[0.408] 
Δgast – US 
-4.049 
[0.000] 
Note: All variables are log-transformed. The optimal lag order was selected by the Schwarz 
information criteria with the inclusion of an intercept and a trend. The corresponding p-values are 
presented in square parentheses. The test critical values are -3.479, -2.891 and -2.572 for the 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
4.1 Pass-through of crude oil to natural gas prices 
The first section of the empirical results is about the relationship between crude oil 
and natural gas. Initially, the two commodities are tested for cointegration. The 
bounds of the critical values of tBDM and FPSS are presented in Table 5.  The obtained 
values derived from the specification models in Equations (1)-(4) are demonstrated in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 5: Critical values of the cointegration tests 
Statistic 
k=1 (95%) k=2 (95%) 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
tBDM -2.86 -3.22 -2.86 -3.53 
FPSS 4.94 5.73 3.79 4.85 
 k=1 (90%) k=2 (90%) 
 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
tBDM -2.57 -2.91 -2.57 -3.21 
FPSS 4.04 4.78 3.17 4.14 
Note: k is the number of regressors. In the symmetric ARDL k equals to 1, while in the asymmetric 
specification k varies between 1 and 2. The confidence intervals are presented in parentheses. 
 
In the conventional linear ARDL specification (Equation (1)) the reported values of 
tBDM and FPSS are -3.198 and 5.274, respectively. Although no conclusions can be 
drawn at the 5% significance level, since the values lie between the critical bounds, 
the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 10% by both tests. When short- and long-
run asymmetries are introduced (Equation (2)), the corresponding values are -3.498 
and 4.154. The null is clearly rejected by the t-test at the 10% significance level whilst 
the F-test rejects the hypothesis of no cointegration only for k=2. The results of the 
cointegration tests indicate a long-run causal relationship between the two variables. 
The differences that arise among the specification models are due to possible short- 
and long-run non-linearities. 
 Consequently, Wald tests for the investigation of short- and long-run 
symmetry have to be applied to the unrestricted NARDL for the avoidance of model 
misspecifications. In the latter, evidence of a statistically strong form of short-run 
asymmetry (WSR) was found. By contrast, in the long-run (WLR), the responses of the 
natural gas prices to positive and negative changes of the crude oil prices were 
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symmetric. Hence, the most appropriate NARDL model for the oil-natural gas 
relationship is the one that allows for short-run asymmetric behavior. The long-run 
coefficient Lwti is positive (0.439) and statistically significant at the 10% level, 
implying that a 1% price increase (decrease) of crude oil results in the growth (drop) 
of natural gas prices by 0.439% in the long-term horizon, ceteris paribus. The 
restricted symmetric ARDL model also provides a positive and significant coefficient, 
yet the short-run asymmetric effects are masked. The three- and seven-period lagged 
increases of crude oil have a respective negative and positive effect in the natural gas 
responses, while the contemporaneous decrease affects the prices in a positive way. 
Therefore, natural gas prices respond not only in an asymmetric manner to crude oil 
price variations in the short-run, but also with a certain temporal delay. More 
specifically, a rise of 1% in oil price causes a cumulative decrease of 0.021% in 
natural gas price. Similarly, a 1% decrease is associated with a reduction of 0.421%. 
As can be seen, natural gas prices behave more intensively to oil price decreases than 
increases in the short-run. It is also worth noting that in both models that include 
short-run asymmetry, natural gas prices decrease in the short-run, regardless the 
movement of oil prices. 
 Table 6 contains also several other diagnostic statistics. More specifically, 
tests for the absence of serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey test), for optimum model 
specification (Ramsey-RESET test) and for normality of the residuals (Jarque-Bera 
test) are reported. The chi-squared values indicate that all four specifications suffer 
from non-normality of the residuals but they are also correctly specified and with no 
serial correlation. Furthermore, the structural stability of the coefficient estimates is 
tested by plotting the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ 
test introduced by Brown et al. (1975)). The results reported in Figure 4 support 
stability of all coefficients since the statistics stay within the 5% significance level, 
except for a short time period in 2010 when they lie just over the critical bounds.  
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Table 6: Estimation results of the crude oil-natural gas relationship 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
ngt-1 
-0.045*** 
(0.017) 
ngt-1 
-0.055** 
(0.021) 
ngt-1 
-0.049** 
(0.022) 
ngt-1 
-0.041** 
(0.017) 
wtit-1 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
wti+t-1 
0.012 
(0.014) 
wti+t-1 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
wtit-1 
0.018 
(0.013) 
Δngt-1 
0.119* 
(0.068) 
wti -t-1 
0.016 
(0.013) 
wti -t-1 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
Δngt-1 
0.124* 
(0.069) 
Δngt-3 
-0.098* 
(0.064) 
Δngt-1 
0.125* 
(0.068) 
Δngt-1 
0.121* 
(0.067) 
Δngt-3 
-0.094* 
(0.063) 
Δwti 
0.229*** 
(0.080) 
Δwti+t-3 
-0.305** 
(0.149) 
Δngt-3 
-0.095* 
(0.064) 
Δwti+t-3 
-0.303** 
(0.143) 
Δwtit-4 
-0.143* 
(0.081) 
Δwti+t-4 
-0.276* 
(0.150) 
Δwti 
0.220*** 
(0.081) 
Δwti+t-7 
0.282* 
(0.159) 
Δwtit-7 
0.200** 
(0.097) 
Δwti+t-7 
0.283* 
(0.166) 
Δwtit-4 
-0.149* 
(0.081) 
Δwti -t 
0.421*** 
(0.141) 
  Δwti -t 
0.447*** 
(0.144) 
Δwtit-7 
0.195** 
(0.097) 
  
Const. 
-0.061 
(0.044) 
Const. 
0.080** 
(0.038) 
Const. 
0.050 
(0.035) 
Const. 
-0.022 
(0.053) 
Lwti 
0.592*** 
(0.223) 
Lwti+ 
0.223 
(0.222) 
Lwti+ 
0.506** 
(0.239) 
Lwti 
0.439* 
(0.247) 
  Lwti - 
0.295 
(0.201) 
Lwti - 
0.541** 
(0.216) 
  
R2 0.096 R2 0.100 R2 0.097 R2 0.097 
Adj. R2 0.080 Adj. R2 0.081 Adj. R2 0.078 Adj. R2 0.080 
X 2SC 
13.251 
[0.351] 
X 2SC 
14.459 
[0.272] 
X 2SC 
14.121 
[0.293] 
X 2SC 
11.736 
[0.467] 
X 2FF 
1.515 
[0.468] 
X 2FF 
6.166 
[0.103] 
X 2FF 
2.898 
[0.234] 
X 2FF 
7.550 
[0.056] 
X 2NOR 
235.169 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
168.001 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
228.396 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
209.951 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.198 
[0.001] 
tBDM 
-3.498 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.116 
[0.002] 
tBDM 
-2.930 
[0.003] 
FPSS 
5.274 
[0.005] 
FPSS 
4.154 
[0.006] 
FPSS 
3.630 
[0.013] 
FPSS 
4.304 
[0.014] 
  WLR 
-0.071 
[0.132] 
WLR 
-0.034 
[0.516] 
WSR 
-0.442 
[0.087] 
  WSR 
-0.745 
[0.010] 
    
Note: The general to specific approach is followed for the selection of the proper ARDL specification. 
The latter is selected by starting with max p = max q = 12 and dropping all insignificant variables 
(stepwise regression). The Huber-White covariance method has been applied for the diminution of 
heteroscedasticity. The long-run coefficients Lwti, Lwti+ and Lwti - are equal to –ρwti/ρy, –ρwti+/ρy and –ρwti -
/ρy, respectively. X 2SC, X 2FF and X 2NOR denote tests for serial correlation, functional form (Ramsey 
RESET test) and normality. tBDM stands for the BDM t-statistic whilst FPSS is the PSS F-statistic. The 
Wald tests for long- and short-run symmetry are denoted as WLR and WSR. The standard errors are 
presented in parentheses while the associated p-values in square parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% are denoted by*, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Note: The dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 4: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals 
 
Figure 5 plots the additive dynamic multipliers of each version of the NARDL 
methodology which are associated with the responses of natural gas to a unit shock to 
crude oil prices. The Wald tests indicated a short-run asymmetric relationship 
between the two fuels, a finding that is supported by the observation of the bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the asymmetric multipliers difference. As a matter of fact, the 
imposition of short-run symmetry restrictions leads to a serious model 
misspecification since the shape of the multipliers is radically altered.   
The responses of both short-run asymmetric specifications provide similar 
conclusions, illustrating that an oil shock has a negative effect in natural gas prices. In 
the case when both short- and long-run asymmetries are considered, the shock dies 
away only after twenty-two weeks, whilst in the short-run asymmetric model the 
corresponding period is reduced to seven weeks. After that, the critical bounds contain 
the zero value and the asymmetry is no longer statistically significant. As far as the 
temporary asymmetry is concerned, there is a pronounced difference between the 
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responses to a positive and a negative oil shock. The natural gas market reacts more 
aggressively and rapidly in the first occasion while its response to downward prices is 
rather steady. 
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Note: The lightly dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 5: Crude oil-natural gas dynamic multipliers 
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4.2 Pass-through of crude oil to gasoline prices 
As far as the crude oil-gasoline relationship is concerned, the obtained values derived 
from the specification models in Equations (1)–(4) for Greece, Italy, Spain, UK and 
US are demonstrated in Tables 7-11, respectively.  
4.2.1 Greece 
In the case of Greece (Table 7), the reported values of the cointegration tests tBDM and 
FPSS in the restricted symmetric model are -3.218 and 5.209. The null hypothesis of no 
long-run relationship is rejected at the 10% significance level while no solid inference 
can be drawn at the 5%. The latter happens in the NARDL with short-run asymmetry 
as well, whereby the null is rejected even at the 5%. In contrast, when long-run 
asymmetries are considered, no evidence of a cointegrating relationship between 
crude oil and retail gasoline prices was found.  
 The Wald tests for short- and long-run symmetry indicate that the asymmetric 
behavior is not present in the particular pair-wise relationship in neither of the cases. 
Hence, gasoline prices in Greece seem to respond similarly in crude oil price 
increases and decreases and, therefore, the symmetric NARDL specification will be 
examined hereafter. The long-run coefficient Lwti is positive (0.463) and highly 
significant, implying that a 1% price increase (decrease) of crude oil results in the 
growth (drop) of Greek gasoline prices by 0.463% in the long-term horizon, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, the stepwise regression results show that gasoline prices are 
mostly affected by oil price changes until two weeks later.    
 In relevance to the diagnostic statistics, although the model is correctly 
specified and serial correlation is absent, there is evidence of non-normality of the 
residuals. Finally, from the CUSUMSQ stability test seems that for the particular 
sample period the residuals variance is rather unstable since for most of the half of the 
sample period, the statistics exceed the 5% significance critical lines (Figure 6).    
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Table 7: Estimation results of the crude oil-gasoline relationship in Greece 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
gast-1 
-0.036** 
(0.017) 
gast-1 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
gast-1 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
gast-1 
-0.041** 
(0.020) 
wtit-1 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
wti+t-1 
0.012 
(0.009) 
wti+t-1 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
wtit-1 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
Δgast-1 
0.178*** 
(0.050) 
wti -t-1 
0.013 
(0.009) 
wti -t-1 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
Δgast-1 
0.184*** 
(0.049) 
Δwti 
0.055** 
(0.027) 
Δgast-1 
0.179*** 
(0.050) 
Δgast-1 
0.169*** 
(0.051) 
Δwti+t-2 
0.107*** 
(0.038) 
Δwtit-1 
0.059** 
(0.026) 
Δwti+t-2 
0.104*** 
(0.039) 
Δwti 
0.054** 
(0.027) 
Δwti+t-6 
0.081* 
(0.044) 
Δwtit-2 
0.110*** 
(0.024) 
Δwti+t-6 
0.081* 
(0.044) 
Δwtit-1 
0.054** 
(0.026) 
Δwti+t-9 
-0.084** 
(0.034) 
  Δwti+t-9 
-0.085** 
(0.034) 
Δwtit-2 
0.111*** 
(0.024) 
Δwti –t-1 
0.147*** 
(0.041) 
  Δwti –t-1 
0.152*** 
(0.041) 
Δwtit-6 
0.043* 
(0.026) 
Δwti –t-2 
0.098** 
(0.043) 
  Δwti –t-2 
0.105** 
(0.044) 
    
Const. 
-0.047*** 
(0.018) 
Const. 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
Const. 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
Const. 
-0.042 
(0.026) 
Lwti 
0.463*** 
(0.072) 
Lwti+ 
0.340** 
(0.138) 
Lwti+ 
0.426*** 
(0.104) 
Lwti 
0.407*** 
(0.072) 
  Lwti - 
0.360*** 
(0.114) 
Lwti - 
0.432*** 
(0.085) 
  
R2 0.213 R2 0.230 R2 0.225 R2 0.229 
Adj. R2 0.200 Adj. R2 0.210 Adj. R2 0.207 Adj. R2 0.211 
X 2SC 
8.710 
[0.727] 
X 2SC 
11.141 
[0.516] 
X 2SC 
11.221 
[0.510] 
X 2SC 
9.384 
[0.669] 
X 2FF 
4.093 
[0.129] 
X 2FF 
2.100 
[0.349] 
X 2FF 
2.364 
[0.306] 
X 2FF 
2.279 
[0.319] 
X 2NOR 
335.770 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
300.155 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
284.418 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
316.861 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.218 
[0.001] 
tBDM 
-2.616 
[0.009] 
tBDM 
-2.828 
[0.005] 
tBDM 
-3.358 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
5.209 
[0.005] 
FPSS 
4.052 
[0.007] 
FPSS 
3.824 
[0.010] 
FPSS 
5.836 
[0.003] 
  WLR 
-0.019 
[0.539] 
WLR 
-0.006 
[0.821] 
WSR 
-0.141 
[0.110] 
  WSR 
-0.156 
[0.167] 
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 Note: The dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 6: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (Greece) 
 
The dynamic multipliers for the crude oil-retail gasoline relationship in Greece are 
presented in Figure 7. The indications for symmetry both in the short- and in the long-
run derived from the Wald tests are corroborated from the dynamic multipliers as 
well. When short-run asymmetries are included, there is a cumulative negative 
response of gasoline prices to crude oil shocks, meaning that there is a form of 
asymmetry. However, it is not statistically significant for almost the entire period. By 
observing the symmetric specification, it can be seen that approximately 75% of the 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is achieved within two weeks while the 
remaining disequilibrium error needs significantly more time to be corrected. 
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Note: The lightly dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 7: Crude oil-retail gasoline dynamic multipliers (Greece) 
 
4.2.2 Italy 
The estimation results of the four specifications for the relationship between crude oil 
and Italian retail gasoline prices are presented in Table 8. The comparison of the 
obtained values of tBDM and FPSS cointegration tests with the corresponding critical 
ones leads to the failure to reject the null of no cointegration. The last-mentioned 
applies to all versions of the NARDL model and, consequently, there is no evidence 
of a long-run causal relationship between the two commodities. The latter can be 
attributed to the sample period or the weekly frequency that are used. 
 The implementation of the Wald tests shows that there is a strong asymmetric 
behavior in the short-run responses of gasoline to oil price variations. However, in the 
long-run the gasoline price reactions seem to be symmetric. Consequently, the most 
appropriate methodology to examine is the NARDL model with short-run asymmetry. 
Since there is not a cointegrating relationship between the variables, the long-run 
coefficient Lwti, although statistically significant, cannot be interpreted as before. The 
contemporaneous term alongside with the one-, nine- and twelve-period lagged 
increases of crude oil prices affect positively the gasoline responses. A 1% increase of 
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upstream prices results in a cumulative 0.357% rise in downstream prices. 
Correspondingly, if oil prices decrease by 1%, the gasoline prices will fall by almost 
0.1%. This temporal asymmetry is in favor of the retailers whose less intense response 
to oil price decreases leads to additional profits for them. 
 Additionally, the specific NARDL model passes all the tests for serial 
correlation, normality of the residuals and general misspecification. The plots of the 
cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals show that the latter are within the 
critical bounds indicating stability in the estimated coefficients (Figure 8). 
Figure 9 demonstrates the corresponding dynamic multipliers for the Italian 
gasoline market whose shape is totally changed when the short-run asymmetries are 
included. For the first eight weeks the market exhibits muted responses not only to 
booms but also to recessionary shocks. From this point until almost ten months later, 
there is a cumulative positive and statistically significant effect of crude oil shocks to 
retail gasoline prices, indicating asymmetry in favor of positive innovations. In other 
words, gasoline sellers are quick to increase and slow to decrease prices when an 
input shock occurs.  
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Table 8: Estimation results of the crude oil-gasoline relationship in Italy 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
gast-1 
-0.029*** 
(0.010) 
gast-1 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
gast-1 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
gast-1 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
wtit-1 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
wti+t-1 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
wti+t-1 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
wtit-1 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Δgast-1 
0.146*** 
(0.048) 
wti -t-1 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
wti -t-1 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
Δgast-1 
0.157*** 
(0.050) 
Δgast-3 
-0.100** 
(0.045) 
Δgast-1 
0.162*** 
(0.047) 
Δgast-1 
0.149*** 
(0.049) 
Δgast-3 
-0.116** 
(0.049) 
Δgast-9 
0.041** 
(0.019) 
Δgast-3 
-0.111** 
(0.045) 
Δgast-3 
-0.098** 
(0.045) 
Δgast-9 
-0.101* 
(0.055) 
Δwti 
0.138*** 
(0.019) 
Δgast-9 
-0.097** 
(0.047) 
Δgast-9 
-0.094* 
(0.048) 
Δwti+t 
0.099*** 
(0.037) 
Δwtit-1 
0.070*** 
(0.021) 
Δwti+t 
0.107*** 
(0.037) 
Δwtit 
0.139*** 
(0.019) 
Δwti+t-1 
0.088*** 
(0.033) 
Δwtit-5 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
Δwti+t-1 
0.087** 
(0.034) 
Δwtit-1 
0.068*** 
(0.021) 
Δwti+t-9 
0.109*** 
(0.035) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.033* 
(0.017) 
Δwti+t-9 
0.109*** 
(0.033) 
Δwtit-5 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
Δwti+t-12 
0.061** 
(0.030) 
Δwtit-9 
0.041** 
(0.019) 
Δwti+t-12 
0.063** 
(0.030) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.033* 
(0.018) 
Δwti –t 
0.172*** 
(0.038) 
  Δwti –t 
0.169*** 
(0.006) 
Δwtit-9 
0.041** 
(0.019) 
Δwti –t-8 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
  Δwti –t-8 
-0.074** 
(0.032) 
    
Const. 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
Const. 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Const. 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Const. 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
Lwti 
0.442*** 
(0.076) 
Lwti+ 
0.606*** 
(0.102) 
Lwti+ 
0.460*** 
(0.076) 
Lwti 
0.606*** 
(0.146) 
  Lwti - 
0.582*** 
(0.098) 
Lwti - 
0.450*** 
(0.068) 
  
R2 0.275 R2 0.278 R2 0.275 R2 0.276 
Adj. R2 0.256 Adj. R2 0.254 Adj. R2 0.254 Adj. R2 0.254 
X 2SC 
7.157 
[0.847] 
X 2SC 
6.086 
[0.911] 
X 2SC 
7.144 
[0.847] 
X 2SC 
6.429 
[0.892] 
X 2FF 
0.012 
[0.993] 
X 2FF 
0.004 
[0.997] 
X 2FF 
0.009 
[0.995] 
X 2FF 
0.005 
[0.997] 
X 2NOR 
0.982 
[0.611] 
X 2NOR 
1.306 
[0.520] 
X 2NOR 
0.923 
[0.630] 
X 2NOR 
1.402 
[0.492] 
tBDM 
-2.683 
[0.007] 
tBDM 
-2.256 
[0.024] 
tBDM 
-2.212 
[0.027] 
tBDM 
-2.173 
[0.030] 
FPSS 
3.682 
[0.026] 
FPSS 
3.366 
[0.018] 
FPSS 
2.511 
[0.058] 
FPSS 
4.567 
[0.011] 
  WLR 
0.023 
[0.202] 
WLR 
0.010 
[0.624] 
WSR 
0.261 
[0.003] 
  WSR 
-0.272 
[0.002] 
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Note: The dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 8: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (Italy) 
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Note: The lightly dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 9: Crude oil-retail gasoline dynamic multipliers (Italy) 
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4.2.3 Spain 
As far as the Spanish gasoline market is concerned (Table 9), there is a statistically 
robust long-run causal relationship between crude oil and retail gasoline prices. As a 
matter of fact, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in all four 
specifications (symmetric, SR and LR asymmetry, LR asymmetry and SR asymmetry) 
at the 5% significance level implying that the two particular commodities share a 
historical cointegrating relationship. 
 The subsequent step is to test for potential short- or long-run asymmetries 
through the Wald tests. The null of symmetry is rejected by both tests, something that 
signifies a different response of gasoline prices to oil price deviations not only in the 
short- but also in the long-run. For this reason, the appropriate specification for 
hypothesis testing is the NARDL in which both short- and long-term asymmetries are 
accommodated. The long-run coefficients Lwti
+
 and Lwti
 -are statistically significant at 
the 1% and affect in a positive manner the gasoline prices. A 1% growth of crude oil 
prices will result in an increase of Spanish gasoline prices by 0.547% whilst a 
corresponding drop will give rise to a 0.526% decrease. In the short-run, if crude oil 
prices increase by 1%, there will be an additive growth of 0.397% in gasoline prices. 
By contrast, in the case that the contemporaneous and the eight-period lagged 
decreases decline by 1%, they will cause a cumulative decrease of 0.095%. Thus, the 
magnitude of gasoline price responses, both in the short- and in the long-run, is 
greater in oil price increases than decreases, corroborating the fact of asymmetries at 
the expense of the consumers who do not benefit of downward price trends as much 
as they lose in corresponding upward trends. 
 Finally, the asymmetric model passes the tests for serial correlation, general 
misspecification and normality of the residuals. The CUSUMSQ stability test indicates 
a stable equation, therefore stable coefficients, since the statistics lie within the 5% 
critical interval (Figure 10). 
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Table 9: Estimation results of the crude oil-gasoline relationship in Spain 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
gast-1 
-0.058*** 
(0.015) 
gast-1 
-0.073*** 
(0.021) 
gast-1 
-0.089*** 
(0.020) 
gast-1 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
wtit-1 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
wti+t-1 
0.040*** 
(0.010) 
wti+t-1 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
wtit-1 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
Δgast-1 
0.160*** 
(0.048) 
wti -t-1 
0.038*** 
(0.010) 
wti -t-1 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
Δgast-1 
0.196*** 
(0.046) 
Δgast-2 
-0.087** 
(0.040) 
Δgast-1 
0.187*** 
(0.046) 
Δgast-1 
0.195*** 
(0.045) 
Δgast-2 
-0.089** 
(0.041) 
Δgast-4 
0.108** 
(0.048) 
Δgast-4 
0.105** 
(0.050) 
Δgast-4 
0.120** 
(0.050) 
Δgast-4 
0.096* 
(0.048) 
Δwti 
0.207*** 
(0.020) 
Δgast-9 
-0.094* 
(0.054) 
Δwtit 
0.218*** 
(0.020) 
Δgast-9 
-0.102* 
(0.054) 
Δwtit-1 
0.048** 
(0.023) 
Δwti+t 
0.221*** 
(0.038) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.052** 
(0.020) 
Δwti+t 
0.204*** 
(0.036) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.052** 
(0.020) 
Δwti+t-9 
0.091** 
(0.038) 
  Δwti+t-9 
0.095*** 
(0.036) 
  Δwti+t-12 
0.085*** 
(0.033) 
  Δwti+t-12 
0.082** 
(0.033) 
  Δwti –t 
0.196*** 
(0.041) 
  Δwti –t 
0.209*** 
(0.040) 
  Δwti –t-8 
-0.099** 
(0.042) 
  Δwti –t-8 
-0.101** 
(0.041) 
Const. 
-0.087*** 
(0.024) 
Const. 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Const. 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
Const. 
-0.090*** 
(0.025) 
Lwti 
0.457*** 
(0.041) 
Lwti+ 
0.547*** 
(0.047) 
Lwti+ 
0.489*** 
(0.031) 
Lwti 
0.522*** 
(0.063) 
  Lwti - 
0.526*** 
(0.043) 
Lwti - 
0.472*** 
(0.028) 
  
R2 0.317 R2 0.328 R2 0.310 R2 0.329 
Adj. R2 0.303 Adj. R2 0.308 Adj. R2 0.298 Adj. R2 0.309 
X 2SC 
10.056 
[0.611] 
X 2SC 
8.070 
[0.779] 
X 2SC 
16.014 
[0.190] 
X 2SC 
9.944 
[0.620] 
X 2FF 
0.048 
[0.952] 
X 2FF 
0.440 
[0.802] 
X 2FF 
11.221 
[0.510] 
X 2FF 
0.687 
[0.709] 
X 2NOR 
1.113 
[0.573] 
X 2NOR 
0.450 
[0.798] 
X 2NOR 
0.709 
[0.701] 
X 2NOR 
0.374 
[0.829] 
tBDM 
-3.801 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.631 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-4.558 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.104 
[0.002] 
FPSS 
7.255 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
5.273 
[0.001] 
FPSS 
7.568 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
6.099 
[0.002] 
  WLR 
0.021 
[0.024] 
WLR 
0.017 
[0.022] 
WSR 
0.274 
[0.003] 
  WSR 
0.302 
[0.001] 
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 Note: The dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 10: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (Spain) 
 
The dynamic multipliers for the relationship between crude oil and Spanish retail 
gasoline prices are demonstrated in Figure 11. Although the market adjustment is not 
rapid in the very short-run (NARDL with LR and SR asymmetry), after almost two 
months the asymmetry has a positive impact on the gasoline responses which lasts 
another three months. The remaining disequilibrium error takes a substantial time 
period to be fully corrected, making the full adjustment to the equilibrium a prolonged 
process and, consequently, verifying the long-run asymmetric behavior.  
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Note: The lightly dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 11: Crude oil-retail gasoline dynamic multipliers (Spain) 
 
4.2.4 The UK 
The results for the retail gasoline market in the UK are demonstrated in Table 10. The 
cointegration statistics of the restricted model tBDM and FPSS are equal to -4.355 and 
9.675, respectively, indicating a clear cointegrating relationship between the two 
variables since the null is rejected even at the 5% significance level. Evidence of this 
long-run co-movement is also found when asymmetric behavior is taken into account. 
 It is also revealed, through the imposition of the Wald tests, that short- and 
long-run symmetry fails to be rejected, implying that gasoline prices will respond 
similarly in crude oil price increases and decreases. Hence, the symmetric ARDL 
specification will be thereafter under investigation. The long-run coefficient Lwti is 
equal to 0.407 and strongly significant. The corresponding statistically significant 
lagged values of oil price changes, apart from the contemporaneous term, are the one-, 
five- and eight-period lags. Thus, UK gasoline prices are partially affected even two 
months after an oil price variation. 
 In relevance to the diagnostic tests of the symmetric specification, despite the 
fact that the residuals do not follow the normal distribution, the model suffers neither 
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from serial correlation nor from some form of general misspecification. Finally, by 
plotting the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals it is apparent that there 
is structural stability in the coefficients (Figure 12).   
 The aforementioned short- and long-run symmetric behavior that the Wald 
tests indicated can be observed through the dynamic multipliers (Figure 13). There 
may be a sort of temporal asymmetry in the short-run asymmetric cases, yet it is 
statistically insignificant. More than the half of the traverse to the equilibrium is 
achieved within two months, illustrating a fast adjustment of the UK gasoline market 
both in a recessionary crude oil shock and in a cyclical upswing.  
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Table 10: Estimation results of the crude oil-gasoline relationship in UK 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
gast-1 
-0.067*** 
(0.015) 
gast-1 
-0.075*** 
(0.022) 
gast-1 
-0.079*** 
(0.023) 
gast-1 
-0.068*** 
(0.016) 
wtit-1 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
wti+t-1 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
wti+t-1 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
wtit-1 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Δgast-1 
-0.144*** 
(0.052) 
wti -t-1 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
wti -t-1 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
Δgast-1 
-0.124** 
(0.051) 
Δwti 
0.089*** 
(0.023) 
Δgast-1 
-0.119** 
(0.053) 
Δgast-1 
-0.136** 
(0.055) 
Δwti+t-1 
0.164*** 
(0.045) 
Δwtit-1 
0.089*** 
(0.029) 
Δwti+t-1 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
Δwtit 
0.092*** 
(0.023) 
Δwti+t-8 
-0.110*** 
(0.038) 
Δwtit-5 
0.062** 
(0.026) 
Δwti+t-8 
-0.109*** 
(0.038) 
Δwtit-1 
0.085*** 
(0.029) 
Δwti+t-9 
0.078** 
(0.036) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.063*** 
(0.023) 
Δwti+t-9 
0.079** 
(0.036) 
Δwtit-5 
0.060** 
(0.026) 
Δwti –t 
0.173*** 
(0.043) 
  Δwti –t 
0.173*** 
(0.043) 
Δwtit-8 
-0.064*** 
(0.023) 
Δwti –t-5 
0.110** 
(0.043) 
  Δwti –t-5 
0.108** 
(0.043) 
    
Const. 
-0.074*** 
(0.020) 
Const. 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Const. 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
Const. 
-0.060*** 
(0.020) 
Lwti 
0.407*** 
(0.042) 
Lwti+ 
0.378*** 
(0.051) 
Lwti+ 
0.426*** 
(0.041) 
Lwti 
0.361*** 
(0.044) 
  Lwti - 
0.371*** 
(0.044) 
Lwti - 
0.415*** 
(0.037) 
  
R2 0.182 R2 0.195 R2 0.184 R2 0.194 
Adj. R2 0.167 Adj. R2 0.175 Adj. R2 0.166 Adj. R2 0.177 
X 2SC 
11.232 
[0.509] 
X 2SC 
8.149 
[0.773] 
X 2SC 
10.811 
[0.545] 
X 2SC 
8.209 
[0.768] 
X 2FF 
1.180 
[0.554] 
X 2FF 
1.709 
[0.425] 
X 2FF 
2.168 
[0.338] 
X 2FF 
1.416 
[0.492] 
X 2NOR 
23.746 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
30.905 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
24.867 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
30.485 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-4.355 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.580 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.710 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-4.331 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
9.675 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
6.322 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
6.685 
[0.000] 
FPSS 
9.381 
[0.000] 
  WLR 
0.006 
[0.589] 
WLR 
0.010 
[0.322] 
WSR 
-0.151 
[0.102] 
  WSR 
-0.147 
[0.111] 
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Note: The dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 12: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (UK) 
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Note: The lightly dotted lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure 13: Crude oil-retail gasoline dynamic multipliers (UK) 
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4.2.5 The US 
Table 11 illustrates the estimated coefficients of all four specifications for the crude 
oil-retail gasoline relationship in the US area. The two tests for cointegration show 
that there is a long-run relationship between the two fuels as far as the symmetric 
ARDL is concerned. Despite the fact that no explicit conclusion can be drawn at the 
5%, the null is rejected at the 10% significance level. By contrast, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration fails to be rejected when asymmetries are considered. 
 The implementation of the Wald tests in the unrestricted NARDL model 
indicates that neither short- nor long-run asymmetry can be detected, at least not a 
statistically significant one and, hence, the symmetric ARDL will be under scrutiny. 
These results are in accordance with Karrenbrock (1991) who also fail to find 
evidence of asymmetry in the responses of the particular type of fuel. The long-run 
coefficient Lwti is highly significant and equals to 0.462, meaning that a 1% increase 
(decrease) of crude oil prices causes gasoline prices to rise (fall) by 0.462% in the 
long-term. It is also noteworthy that lagged values of oil price changes do not affect 
considerably downstream prices. 
 The diagnostic tests show that the residuals do not follow the normal 
distribution. However, there is no evidence of serial correlation or any general 
misspecification. The plots of the stability tests are presented in Figure 14. The 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals are within the 5% critical bounds, indicating 
structural stability for the model.  
 As far as the dynamic multipliers are concerned, they are presented in Figure 
15. The Wald tests found no evidence of short- and long-run asymmetry at the 10% 
level in the responses of gasoline prices. However, observing the bootstrap confidence 
intervals of the difference in the short-run asymmetric cases and the corresponding 
adjustment patterns does not support this finding. There is a clear temporal asymmetry 
which lasts almost eight weeks before the convergence to the long-run equilibrium. 
The responses, though, are not in agreement with the held belief that retailers do not 
fully pass through the reduced input prices. In this case, the reaction of gasoline prices 
is more intense and happens more rapidly to a recessionary than to a positive shock.  
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Table 11: Estimation results of the crude oil-gasoline relationship in US 
Symmetric ARDL 
NARDL with SR and 
LR asymmetry 
NARDL with LR 
asymmetry 
NARDL with SR 
asymmetry 
Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. Var. Coeff. 
gast-1 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
gast-1 
-0.023* 
(0.012) 
gast-1 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
gast-1 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
wtit-1 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
wti+t-1 
0.008 
(0.007) 
wti+t-1 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
wtit-1 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
Δgast-1 
0.508*** 
(0.048) 
wti -t-1 
0.008 
(0.007) 
wti -t-1 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
Δgast-1 
0.529*** 
(0.043) 
Δwti 
0.080*** 
(0.022) 
Δgast-1 
0.528*** 
(0.045) 
Δgast-1 
0.508*** 
(0.049) 
Δgast-10 
-0.090 
(0.070) 
  Δgast-10 
-0.091 
(0.071) 
Δwtit 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
Δgast-11 
0.115** 
(0.056) 
  Δgast-11 
0.114** 
(0.055) 
  Δwti+t-9 
0.058 
(0.057) 
  Δwti+t-9 
0.058 
(0.057) 
  Δwti –t 
0.133*** 
(0.033) 
  Δwti –t 
0.133*** 
(0.033) 
    
Const. 
-0.063** 
(0.025) 
Const. 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
Const. 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
Const. 
-0.044* 
(0.024) 
Lwti 
0.462*** 
(0.074) 
Lwti+ 
0.369** 
(0.158) 
Lwti+ 
0.465*** 
(0.095) 
Lwti 
0.380*** 
(0.100) 
  Lwti - 
0.372*** 
(0.135) 
Lwti - 
0.463*** 
(0.082) 
  
R2 0.415 R2 0.440 R2 0.415 R2 0.440 
Adj. R2 0.409 Adj. R2 0.428 Adj. R2 0.408 Adj. R2 0.430 
X 2SC 
13.753 
[0.316] 
X 2SC 
28.018 
[0.005] 
X 2SC 
14.090 
[0.294] 
X 2SC 
27.752 
[0.006] 
X 2FF 
5.039 
[0.168] 
X 2FF 
7.342 
[0.025] 
X 2FF 
5.004 
[0.081] 
X 2FF 
7.109 
[0.028] 
X 2NOR 
32.108 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
54.759 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
32.195 
[0.000] 
X 2NOR 
55.200 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-3.197 
[0.001] 
tBDM 
-1.971 
[0.000] 
tBDM 
-2.414 
[0.016] 
tBDM 
-2.657 
[0.008] 
FPSS 
5.652 
[0.003] 
FPSS 
3.033 
[0.029] 
FPSS 
3.759 
[0.011] 
FPSS 
4.558 
[0.011] 
  WLR 
-0.002 
[0.926] 
WLR 
0.001 
[0.961] 
WSR 
-0.074 
[0.112] 
  WSR 
-0.074 
[0.112] 
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Figure 14: Plots of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (US) 
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Figure 15: Crude oil-retail gasoline dynamic multipliers (US) 
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Summarizing, the results indicated a short-run asymmetric relationship between crude 
oil and natural gas whilst the pricing pass-through mechanism from crude oil to retail 
gasoline varied among the countries. More specifically, in the cases of Greece, UK 
and US no evidence of asymmetry was found, although the dynamic multipliers of the 
latter showed a temporal difference in the responses to positive and negative 
innovations. In Italy, in spite of the fact that there was no cointegration between the 
two commodities, there was a short-run asymmetric behavior in favor of the positive 
shocks. Finally, the results of Spain yielded not only short- but also long-run 
asymmetries.  
 Despite their differences, however, there is a common pattern that emerges 
between the dynamic multipliers of every country. In general, the examined gasoline 
markets display a relatively fast adjustment to the new equilibrium in the first two to 
three months whereby the corresponding traverse has been to a large extent 
accomplished. The countries with no asymmetric behavior needed two or three weeks 
less to achieve this target. After that, the correction of the remaining disequilibrium 
error was a prolonged process.     
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The pass-through mechanism of crude oil to natural gas and, mainly, to gasoline 
prices has been a subject of investigation for many researchers the last thirty years 
because of the important role that these fuels play in the global daily production and 
consumption activities. However, there is no consensus in the results of the empirical 
literature since several parameters, such as the econometric methodology, the 
examined country, the time period of the data used and their frequency, varied across 
cases. Hence, the common perception that downstream prices respond faster to 
upstream price increases than they do to decreases can neither be rejected nor be 
accepted.  
The objective of this study was to look into the dynamic pass-through of 
Cushing, OK WTI crude oil to Henry Hub natural gas and retail gasoline spot prices 
in Greece, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US under the non-linear autoregressive 
distributed (NARDL) model proposed by Shin et al. (2013). By implementing this 
methodology, it was feasible not only to test for short- and long-run asymmetries but 
also to observe through the asymmetric dynamic multipliers the speed of adjustment 
and the impact of positive and negative oil innovations on the two variables.   
The results indicated that the pair-wise relationship between crude oil and 
natural gas suffered from short-run asymmetry while the findings for the oil-gasoline 
relationship of each country were diverse. More specifically, there was evidence of 
short- and long-run symmetry in Greece, the UK and the US, a result that is in 
accordance with Karrenbrock (1991), Bermingham and O’Brien (2010), and Clerides 
(2010). On the other hand, short-run asymmetry was present in the Italian gasoline 
market and strong evidence of short- and long-run asymmetry was found in the 
Spanish market, supporting the results of Galeotti et al. (2003) and Grasso and 
Manera (2007). These findings were corroborated by the dynamic multipliers whereby 
it also seems that the traverse to the new equilibrium has been to a large extent 
accomplished within two to three months. 
The issue of asymmetries in the pricing transmission of crude oil shocks to 
natural gas and retail gasoline concerns not only the public opinion but also the 
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national regulatory energy authorities. The latter alongside with antitrust policy 
makers can make use of the obtained results in order to monitor the market 
competitiveness of the particular fuels and to draw the appropriate energy outlook of 
the country. Evidence of symmetry might be the outcome of an efficient regulatory 
policy in the energy sector. This is easier to take place in developed economies 
whereby the corresponding regulatory authorities face fewer difficulties regarding the 
implementation of the regulation in the retail oil market. However, the desirable level 
of competition is not ensured only by the symmetric behavior of the fuel prices since 
it also matters whether the profit margins of the firms correspond to a reasonable level 
of return on capital. 
The public seems to believe that asymmetric pricing mechanism is the result 
of the monopolization of the oil industry by large integrated firms. Nevertheless, 
previous research (e.g. Peltzman (2000)) provided evidence that market power is not 
correlated with asymmetry between crude oil and natural gas or gasoline. Hence, if 
government intervenes in natural market processes to prevent asymmetries directly, 
with practices such as inventory manipulation or tax variation, economic efficiency 
may be reduced regardless the level of competition. As Brown and Yucel (2000) 
indicate, policy makers should be more concerned about mergers and acquisitions due 
to which the market concentration is increased at the expense of scale economies. 
The asymmetric pass through of crude oil prices to gasoline and natural gas 
affects not only the consumers but also the investment decisions of several private 
firms since these fuels can be used as an input in the production process and, 
additionally, oil and natural gas can serve as substitutable goods both in consumption 
and in production. Thus, firms can use this information for issues like hedging, risk 
management or even for shifting a part of their investment portfolio in renewable 
energy sources. 
To sum up, this study was an attempt to find a potential asymmetric behavior 
of natural gas and gasoline prices at the retail level. However, price asymmetries 
could arise at every stage of the market chain (production, wholesale and retail level). 
As a future work, it would be of great interest to apply this methodology and dataset 
to all stages in order to have a general overview of the issue, try to understand who or 
what may be responsible for and which group is affected the most. 
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